Tastes and Pleasures
Carolyn Korsmeyer, University at Buffalo (SUNY)
1I omit from
this discussion the empiricist distinctions among primary,
secondary, and tertiary qualities. While a detailed
treatment of the senses would require tackling this
subject, few if any aesthetic properties count as primary.
Thus these distinctions will not distinguish gustatory from
2Disinterestedness originates equally as a
concept in theories of moral evaluation.
to locating standards for gustatory taste is fairly
congruent with empiricist perspectives, though it cannot
address Kant’s theory, for which any sense pleasure
lacks the grounds for the universality and necessity that
he ascribes to judgments of aesthetic taste. What is more,
certain of the more frivolous elaborations of gastronomic
standards, such as Kitchener’s insistence that
particular dinner hours and styles of invitation be encoded
in principles of taste, weaken rather than strengthen the
formulation of standards for gustatory taste.